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Sweeney and Clark: Waging Modern War

BOOK REVIEWS

ONE MAN’S OPINION
Clark, Wesley K. Waging Modern War. New York: Public Affairs, 2001. 479pp. $30

This book is retired Army general Wesley
Clark’s anxiously awaited account of
Nato’s operations in Kosovo, dubbed
ALLIED FORCE. As Clark was the Supreme
Allied Commander, Europe (SACEUR)
during Nato’s first war, his account of
this major operation is an important
contribution to the historical record of
events that led to what many consider a
very controversial military endeavor.
Waging Modern War is divided into four
parts. The first briefly addresses General
Clark’s career and his early reputation as
a “fast-burner.” It introduces Clark as the
new Director for Strategic Plans and Policy (J-5) during the Bosnia-Herzegovina
war and presents the same cast of
characters that he would see again later
in his career as SACEUR. The J-5 position allowed Clark to cut his diplomatic
teeth while supporting Ambassador Richard C. Holbrooke’s shuttle diplomacy,
which eventually led to the Dayton
accords. Most importantly, it was at this
time that Clark began to gain his own insights into Yugoslav president Slobodan
Milosevic and what made him tick.
Though Clark discounts any patronage
from his previous Arkansas connections
with former President Bill Clinton, he
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makes it quite clear that he was seldom
the Army’s favorite because of the many
key positions he had held that helped position him for his selection to SACEUR.
This section helps the reader to understand a bit about Clark’s leadership style
and attention to detail (less charitable
people would label him a micromanager)
and his view that the rest of the Army
perceived him as an intellectual and not
from the war-fighter mold. This is a key
insight of a soldier never fully accepted
by his own, and it establishes a thread
woven through the remainder of the
book.
The second section details the events and
preparations that led up to Operation
ALLIED FORCE. Clark lays out the planning challenges he encountered in an alliance that had been formed for an entirely
different threat. At every turn he faced
the need to compromise already accepted
planning procedures. To complicate
things, Clark discovered that his own national strategic-level leadership had little
understanding of his dual-hatted role as
Commander in Chief, U.S. European
Command, and SACEUR, and of the political responsibilities attendant upon the
latter position. This was further
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complicated by the apparent lack of interest that was displayed by both the
Joint Chiefs of Staff and the national
command authorities in focusing upon
the Kosovo situation.
The third part of the book, “The Air
Campaign,” addresses the execution
phase of ALLIED FORCE. Here Clark’s
shortfalls in planning and his inability to
forge a supportive relationship with the
Joint Chiefs of Staff and the secretary of
defense become apparent. Two days into
the operation, Clark wrestled with the
implications of having no defined
end-state and the resulting fuzzy linkage
between military and political objectives.
Incredibly, he attempts to deflect criticism toward the political leadership for
the fundamental flaws in the plan. The
effects of this confused strategy vacuum
lingered throughout the operation. In addition to the strategy challenges faced by
Clark, the Washington leadership was
not supportive—indeed, Clark depicts it
as an impediment. His assessments of
then Secretary of Defense William Cohen, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
General Hugh Shelton, and Army Chief
of Staff General Dennis Reimer are
damning. Clark is unambiguous that
from his perspective, all three men contributed to a lack of national strategic coherence during the operation. This
section ends by depicting a slippery slope
toward an inevitable ground invasion of
Kosovo—something that everyone
wanted to avoid.
The final section of the book, “Endgame,” details the sudden change in circumstances and Milosevic’s willingness
to accept a deal. Clark outlines the
time-sensitive and painstaking negotiations required to ensure an executable
plan for the Nato peacekeeping force. He
also addresses the now famous refusal of

https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol54/iss4/15

his subordinate, Lieutenant General Sir
Michael Jackson of the British army, to
send forces into Pristina airfield to block
the impending arrival of Russian forces.
Clark concludes with an examination of
his experience and its implications for future warfare.
This is a worthwhile book for those interested in the Kosovo conflict and how the
Nato alliance works in practice. Subsequent memoirs from other key participants will add balance to this historical
perspective. As for contributing to the
body of knowledge on military theory, as
the title implies, one must be less enthusiastic. Instead of presenting new theoretical constructs applicable to modern
war, in reality the book displays the pitfalls faced by a joint-force commander
and his national-level superiors when
they disregard the fundamental tenets of
operational art.
PATRICK C. SWEENEY

Colonel, U.S. Army
Naval War College

Watts, Barry D. The Military Use of Space: A Diagnostic Assessment. Washington, D.C.: Center for
Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, 2001. 130pp.

Barry Watts, former director of the
Northrop Grumman Analysis Center and
now the director of the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) Program Analysis and Evaluation, has written an
assessment of military competition in
near-earth space and how that competition may evolve over the next twenty-five
years. Aside from the importance of its
subject, this book is of particular interest
because it explicitly attempts a “net assessment.” Watts worked for Andrew
Marshall, director of the OSD Office of
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